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Abstract
Currently, most flexible group benefit plans are designed and priced based on deterministic
assumptions about the plan members’ option selections. This can cause the adverse selection
spiral, threatening the sustainability of the plan. We therefore propose a comprehensive
framework with a novel pricing formula that incorporates both a model for claims and a
model for plan members’ enrollment decisions to prevent adverse selection. We find through
simulation that our proposed pricing formula outperforms the traditional pricing practice
by keeping flex plans sustainable over time. In addition to preventing the adverse selection
spiral through pricing, our framework also serves as a tool to evaluate the impact of other
parameters such as changes in plan designs, health costs, and member decision.
Keywords: group insurance; flexible benefits; stochastic modelling; adverse selection
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Group benefits are health coverages offered by an organization to its members. Since the
organization (referred to as the plan sponsor) is usually an employer, group benefit plans
are sometimes known as employee benefits. Members within the same plan typically receive
the same coverage, and the lines of benefits (i.e., coverage categories) often include basic
life, accidental death and dismemberment, long term disability, extended healthcare, and
dental care.1 If the plan is insured through a contract with a carrier, then the fee paid by
members in return for the coverage is referred to as the premium; otherwise, it is known as
the deposit if the plan sponsor self-insures the plan. In either case, the rates are generally
the same across the entire group and updated annually, and plan sponsors commonly sub-
sidize this cost.
A flexible group benefit plan (flex plan) is a special type of group benefit plan that offers
plan members the flexibility to select their coverage level annually among a set of predefined
options and deposit rates. Compared to traditional plans, a flex plan has the advantage of
increasing employee satisfaction (Barber et al., 1992), especially as the general workforce
becomes increasingly diverse (French, 2008), while potentially giving the employer more
control over their annual costs by limiting the deposit subsidy to a fixed amount (Skwire,
2016). In fact, flex plans have been gaining popularity since they were first introduced in
Canada in the mid-1980s. By the early 21st century, almost half of major Canadian em-
ployers offered flexible benefits to their employees (McKay, 2007). These plans are usually
self-insured by the plan sponsor through a claims administration agreement with a carrier.
Under this arrangement, an administrative services only (ASO) account acts as the bank
account in which regular deposits are paid into, and claims and administrative expenses are
withdrawn from. Occasionally, the plan sponsor will need to make an extra lump sum de-
1It is common for plan sponsors to allocate members within a group plan to separate classes (e.g., based
on type of employment), where each class is given a different set of coverage. Mathematically, we can treat
these classes as separate plans; therefore we do not make the distinction in our report.
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posit when the balance drops below a minimum requirement; likewise, they may sometimes
withdraw from it when a large surplus accumulates.
Although flex plans can be more appealing than traditional plans, calculating sound deposit
rates is a complex actuarial problem. In general, rates are set so that the total premium
or deposits cover the total expected claims, administrative expense, allowance for reserves,
and sometimes a profit margin. For a traditional group benefit plan, this requires estimating
the upcoming year’s claims, often based on multiplying the current year’s claims by some
trend factor.2 For a flex plan, however, correctly pricing each option also requires accurately
predicting the mix of employees choosing the particular options, but their choices depend
on the rates offered. With this complexity, there is currently no coherent framework for
calculating flex plan deposit rates. A common solution used in practice is to apply the tra-
ditional group benefits model to each option, implying that members remain in the same
option over time.
Unfortunately, this simplifying assumption can be insufficient in pricing sound deposit rates,
which can cause the so-called adverse selection spiral, thereby threatening the sustainability
of the plan.3 Adverse selection is a situation in which the consumer has more information
about their risk than the insurer does, resulting in a product being sold to consumers of
a higher risk group than intended. Specifically, in the flexible benefits context, adverse se-
lection not only requires that members predict the distribution of their health expenses
more accurately than the actuary does, but also that they rationally select an option based
on this prediction (Marquis, 1992).4 When this occurs, the actual claims are higher than
the actuary’s estimate, which drives an increase in the subsequent year’s deposit rate. This
forces healthier employees to switch to lower coverage options, thereby increasing the con-
centration of high-claim employees in a given option. The result is a further increase in per
capita or per volume claims in the subsequent year.5 This cycle of a deficit in the deposit
account, skyrocketing rates, and decreased enrollment eventually spirals until the highest
coverage option quickly becomes unaffordable and obsolete. A classic example of the adverse
2In group benefits, trend refers to inflationary and utilization changes (e.g., change in per visit cost and
and frequency of visits for a paramedical service).
3An adverse selection spiral occurs when healthier insureds drop out of a plan or coverage option, in-
creasing the concentration of high risk insureds covered and thereby causing skyrocketing insurance rates.
4The second condition is not specified in a general setting, where consumers are actively seeking out
insurance. In group benefits, however, members are usually in a plan as a result of group membership such
as employment. In this case, there are a number of reasons why members may not rationally select an option,
including missing the enrollment window or a lack of understanding of the plan coverage.
5Rates may either be priced on a per capita or per volume basis. Volume may refer to, say, $1,000 of
insurance coverage.
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selection spiral observed in practice is the Harvard University employee flex plan (Cutler
and Zeckhauser, 1998), which drove out the highest coverage option in only three years.
Although a number of strategies may be used in practice to prevent adverse selection, they
are mostly related to restricting choice. For example, the step-up/step-down restriction lim-
its plan members to changing coverage by only one level between any two years. A two-year
premium plan lock in requires plan members in the highest coverage option to stay in the
plan for a minimum of two years instead of one. A modular plan bundles different lines
of benefits into one option, thereby limiting the plan members’ flexibility of tailoring the
plan to suit their exact needs.6 Changing the premium subsidy arrangement from a fixed
amount to a level percentage can also be considered a strategy for reducing adverse selection
(Marquis and Buchanan, 1999).
The strategies mentioned above have the obvious shortcoming of either limiting flexibility
for plan members or restricting budget control for plan sponsors, reducing the appeal of
flex plans. An alternative way to control adverse selection is through premium pricing. In
fact, various studies such as Marquis (1992) and van Winssen et al. (2018) have shown that
“individual risk rating,” in which each insured is given a customized rate based on their own
risk, is an effective method for eliminating adverse selection. Unfortunately, this strategy
is not applicable to group benefits, where the same premium or deposit rate applies to the
whole group. Another premium pricing strategy involves applying cross subsidy between
options, which Cave (1985) has shown to be a related to an equilibrium in premium rates
and enrollment over time. However, the study has not been adapted to the flex plan context
to suggest a clear premium pricing formula.
Our solution is to construct a comprehensive flexible group benefits framework and to use
it to develop a pricing formula that is immune to adverse selection. While various models
have been separately proposed for selected components of flex plans, none of them represent
a complete framework. For example, Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992) proposed a model for flex
benefits in the cross-section, but they have not analyzed the dynamic aspect of the prob-
lem; that is, how the plans evolve from one year to another. Mehta et al. (2017) proposed a
dynamic model for option selection and health care consumption, but their model has not
been combined with other aspects of a flex plan into a comprehensive framework. A wide
range of enrollment decision models and observations have been presented in various papers
(e.g., Marquis and Buchanan, 1999; Marquis, 1992; Carlin and Town, 2009; Sturman and
Boudreau, 1994; Maciejewski et al., 2004; Bajari et al., 2006), but there is no consensus on
6Refer to McKay (2007), O’Neill (2012), and Skwire (2016) for more details on adverse selection prevention
strategies used in practice.
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a standard. Our proposed framework combines some of the ideas presented in those papers,
incorporating both a model for claims and a model for plan members’ enrollment decisions.
This comprehensive framework allows us to build a pricing formula that anticipates both
the claims and the plan members’ decisions so that we can prevent adverse selection. Blend-
ing the interest of plan sponsors and members with the actuarial equivalence principle of
premium calculations, we define the following properties for an ideal set of flex plan deposit
rates:
1. At least one member is enrolled in each option at any time,
2. The expected year-end ASO account balance should be as close to zero as possible.
3. The ASO account balance should be kept as stable as possible to avoid the need to
replenish a deficit or withdraw a large surplus, and
4. The deposit rates should be kept as stable as possible from year to year.
The first goal ensures that the pricing does not defeat the purpose of offering options to
members. The second goal ensures that the deposits are sufficient to cover expected claims
and administrative expenses, but are also not too high. The third and fourth goals are
both desirable for the plan sponsor’s budgeting purpose. Finally, the fourth goal is clearly
beneficial to plan members as well.
The remainder of this report is arranged as follows. Details of this framework can be found
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 outlines our assumptions and methodology used to apply this
framework and study the evolution of a hypothetical flex plan over time. Key findings from
the simulation study are summarized in Chapter 4. Our conclusion and suggestions for




We propose a comprehensive framework composed of three main components correspond-
ing to the three main events of an annual flex plan cycle: pricing, option selection, and
claims incurral. These three components are built upon a fourth, structural component




We propose a framework for a flexible group benefits plan with the following features:
• K options, each fully defined through the deductible, coinsurance, coinsurance maxi-
mum, and overall maximum,
• one line of benefit,
• mandatory enrollment,
• single coverage only (i.e., no family or couple coverage),
• annual flex credits F , paid by the plan sponsor to offset the plan members’ deposit
payment, where F ≥ 0, and
• a level percent subsidy s, paid by the plan sponsor to offset the plan members’ deposit
payments, where 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
We assume for simplicity that during each year t from 1 to T , this plan is offered to N plan
members, identified from 1 to N . Note that while simplifying assumptions are made for ease
of highlighting the features of our framework, it can be extended to include other common
designs and situations, such as multiple lines of benefits, family coverage, and a dynamic
group size. Also, although the term “deposit payment” implies the plan is self-insured, the
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calculations are equivalent to an insured plan with premium payments.
2.1.2 Reimbursement Functions
If the coverage of an option can be fully defined by its deductible, coinsurance, coinsurance
maximum and overall maximum, then we can define plan options using the reimbursement
functions below, as in Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992). The following is a restatement of their
proposed function, adapted to the notation used in this report. Let r(l, k) be the reim-
bursement for an annual loss (i.e., health expense) of l incurred under option k, where
k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. Then,
r(l, k) =

0 if l < dk
ck(l − dk) if dk ≤ l < CMk1−ck + dk
l − dk − CMk if CMk1−ck + dk ≤ l < OMk + dk + CMk
OMk if OMk + dk + CMk ≤ l
, (2.1)
where
• dk is the deductible of plan k,
• ck is the coinsurance rate of plan k,
• CMk is the coinsurance maximum of plan k, and
• OMk is the overall maximum of plan k.
Therefore, if a plan member enrolled in option k incurs and submits an annual loss of l to
the plan, then r(l, k) is the total claim amount paid from the plan sponsor’s ASO account
to the plan member for that year. In addition, in our model we explicitly specify that the
reimbursement function parameters are chosen such that r(l, k) ≤ r(l, k′) for all k < k′. In
other words, the option indices are ordered from the lowest to the highest level of coverage.
2.2 Claims
2.2.1 A Model for Annual Health Status
The annual claim amount for each of the N employees depends on their health status in a
given year. Therefore, we introduce a health status model, inspired by Mehta et al. (2017).
Consider an individual’s health status with respect to the benefit offered in the flex plan.7
We define this health status as a numerical score in R, where a high value represents good
7The benefit coverage may be as specific as paramedical coverage or as general as the aggregate extended
health and dental coverage.
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health and a low value describes poor health. While this measure evolves continuously over
time, we propose a discrete-time version, where Ht,j,x denotes the average health status of
individual j who is x years old during year t.
This quantity can be broken down into two components: a deterministic predictable portion,
H
(p)
t,x , and a stochastic unpredictable portion, H
(u)
t,j,x. We can write
Ht,j,x = H(p)t,x +H
(u)
t,j,x,
where the two components evolve separately.
The predictable portion, H(p)t,x , represents the mean health status of all individuals aged x






The unpredictable portion, H(u)t,j,x, represents the hidden factors (e.g., lifestyle and medical





t,j,x + εt,j , (2.2)
where εt,j is an independent normal random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
σ, i.e., N (0, σ).
Combining the above dynamics, we have
Ht+1,j,x+1 = Ht,j,x − λ+ εt,j (2.3)
with some random variable H(unc)t,j,x0 . While birth would be a reasonable candidate for the





∼ N (H(p)t,x0 , ζ),
where ζ is the standard deviation of x0-year-olds’ health statuses. It follows from Equation









ζ2 + (x− x0)σ2
)
, x > x0. (2.4)
To alleviate notation, we drop the third index in Ht,j,x for the remainder of this report,
since an individual’s age can be expressed as a function of t and j.
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2.2.2 A Model for Annual Loss
Due to random noise, like accuracy of diagnosis or availability of treatment, an individual’s
health status does not deterministically translate into the loss incurred. Rather, plan mem-
ber j’s aggregate loss throughout year t with respect to the benefit may be modelled as a
random variable, Lt,j , which depends on an unknown mean parameter, µt,j ≡ E[Lt,j ], and
other known parameters.8 The unknown mean parameter is modelled as a function of the
unknown health status:
µt,j = gt(Ht,j) (2.5)
= eβt,0+βt,1Ht,j .
Note that this link function offers flexibility for pricing purposes—the parameters βt,0 and
βt,1 can be easily updated to reflect anticipated shocks (such as prescription drug “patent
cliffs”), cost inflation, and utilization changes in an upcoming year. The realized loss can
then be converted into an annual claim via the reimbursement functions discussed in Section
2.1.2.9
2.3 Modelling Plan Members’ Option Selection
The plan members’ decision-making process typically involves taking time to understand
the plan coverage, anticipating their upcoming loss, and evaluating the K coverage options
given their risk-aversion levels. Recall that our key motivation for designing the framework
is to combat adverse selection, which arises when plan members rationally select their plan
options. Therefore, in our framework, we assume all plan members are diligent, meaning
they understand the health status dynamics, loss distributions, and make rational plan
choices. Specifically, we model their decisions using expected utility theory.
2.3.1 A Model for Plan Members’ Intuition of their Upcoming Health
Status
Although the true values of health statuses are unknown to all parties, each plan member
has an intuition of their upcoming year’s health status. Let Ht,j represent plan member j’s
intuitive estimate of their health status in year t. We treat this intuition as an unbiased
8Note that we can reparameterize distributions so that the unknown parameter is the mean.
9We assume that any moral hazard is negligible; otherwise, a plan members’ incurred loss may depend
on their selected option.
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estimate of their true health, where the estimation error follows a normal distribution. In
other words, we have
Ht,j = Ht,j + νt,j , (2.6)
and νt,j ∼ N (0, δ).
2.3.2 Plan Members’ Anticipated Plan Usage
As mentioned in the introduction, adverse selection occurs when members can accurately
predict their plan usage. We therefore model diligent plan members as inherently knowing
the conditional distribution of annual loss, given a health status. This means plan member
j’s projection of their loss in year t is consistent with inherently estimating the mean
parameter of their loss distribution as
µt,j = gt(Ht,j)
= eβt,0+βt,1Ht,j
and then anticipating the plausible range and probabilities of their potential loss using the
true annual loss distribution given this estimated mean parameter, µt,j .
2.3.3 Utility Maximization
Choosing between the plan options involves evaluating not just the potential financial out-
comes from each option, but also the utility gained from these financial outcomes. As in
Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992), we can model the plan members’ enrollment decisions by ap-
plying the expected utility framework, which assumes that an individual’s preference under
risk is consistent with choosing the option that maximizes their expected utility. Note that
although utility is commonly modelled as a function of an individual’s total wealth during a
particular time interval, in our framework we consider only the portion of wealth associated
with employment. This deviation from the typical model keeps our framework realistic;
pricing actuaries would not know or estimate plan members’ income from sources outside
of employment.
Recall that the plan sponsor may subsidize a portion s of the deposit amount, or offer fixed
annual flex credits of F to plan members. We define the annual consumption10 associated
with employment for plan member j enrolled in option k in year t as
10We assume that the difference in tax implications between taxable wages, non-taxable reimbursements,
and any remaining credits paid out are negligible and can therefore be ignored.
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wt,j − (1− s)Dt,k + F + r(Lt,j , k)− Lt,j ,
where
• wt,j is the salary of plan member j in year t, and
• Dt,k is the deposit rate of option k in year t.
Let ut,j( · ;Rt,j) be the utility function and Rt,j be the risk aversion parameter of plan
member j in year t. Then plan member j’s utility of consumption in year t is
ut,j(wt,j − (1− s)Dt,k + F + r(Lt,j , k)− Lt,j ;Rt,j)
given they have enrolled in option k. A diligent plan member will choose an option with
the highest expected utility.
Let Ut,j be the option which maximizes expected utility for plan member j in year t, given
a vector of annual deposit rates, Dt = [Dt,1, Dt,2, ..., Dt,K ]. In other words,




ut,j(wt,j − (1− s)Dt,k + F + r(Lt,j , k)− Lt,j ;Rt,j)
∣∣∣µt,j] .
Since we assume that all plan members rationally maximize their expected utility, we can
define St,j(Dt, µt,j) ≡ Ut,j as plan member j’s selected option in year t, given the deposit
rates and the plan member’s expected annual loss.11
2.4 Calculating Deposit Rates
2.4.1 The Actuary’s Estimator for Health Statuses
As mentioned in the introduction, a highlight of our framework is our pricing method, which
incorporates both the annual claims and selection models. Since these models depend on the
true health statuses and perceived health statuses, respectively, the pricing actuary needs
to estimate both these latent variables.
Let H̃t,j represent the pricing actuary’s assessment of plan member j’s true health status in
year t. One convenient way to estimate the distribution of this quantity is to simply use the
unconditional distribution in Equation (2.4).12 However, since we assume that the actuary
11While St,j(Dt, µt,j) is equivalent to Ut,j in this section, we distinguish between these two quantities in
a proposed extention of the model, as shown in Appendix C.
12Estimating health statuses based on the unconditional distribution is analogous to treating the group as
having no credibility and thereby selecting manual rates as deposit rates. Manual rates refer to the insurer’s
rate table, and will be discussed again in Chapters 3 and 4.
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also observes the plan member’s past losses, a more accurate method of estimating these
distributions is through the conditional distribution given the observed past losses. In other
words, the actuary predicts the posterior distribution of Ht,j denoted by
H̃t,j ≡ Ht,j |L1:t−1,j ,
where L1:t−1,j = {Li,j}t−1i=1.
The distribution of H̃t,j , known as the predictive distribution in filtering, can be calculated






fHt,j |Ht−1,j (ht,j |ht−1,j)fHt−1,j |L1:t−1,j (ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j)dht−1,j . (2.7)
As shown in Appendix A.1, the distribution of Ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j , also known as the filtering
distribution, can be found recursively from the distribution of Ht−2,j |L1:t−2,j using the
following formula:
fHt−1,j |L1:t−1,j (ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j) (2.8)
=
∫
R fLt−1,j |Ht−1,j (Lt−1,j |ht−1,j)fHt−1,j |Ht−2,j (ht−1,j |ht−2,j)fHt−2,j |L1:t−2,j (ht−2,j |L1:t−2,j)dht−2,j∫
R2 fLt−1,j |Ht−1,j (Lt−1,j |ht−1,j)fHt−1,j |Ht−2,j (ht−1,j |ht−2,j)fHt−2,j |L1:t−2,j (ht−2,j |L1:t−2,j)dht−1,jdht−2,j
,
where the starting distribution is the unconditional health status density in the year prior to
the start of loss observation. So far, for simplicity, we assume in our notation that losses are
observed starting in year 1. In general, past loss data from years prior to plan implementa-





(ht0,j). Note that this distribution, as well as the density functions
of Lt,j |Ht,j and Ht,j |Ht−1,j (all previously introduced in Section 2.2), are assumed to be
known to the actuary.
Given the complicated nature of solving the above recursion, we employ a filter to obtain a
numerical approximation. While a commonly used filtering algorithm is the particle filter, in
our project we apply the unscented Kalman filter (Julier and Uhlmann, 1997, UKF hence-
forth), which turns out to be both a suitable and a more efficient algorithm for solving the
above recursion. Note that by construction, the UKF assumes that the conditional distri-
bution can be approximated by a normal distribution. We have assessed the validity of this
assumption in our context by simulating health statuses and losses for a hypothetical group
of flex plan members and generating estimates using both filters. Since the UKF estimates
are very similar to results from the particle filter (which does not assume any particular
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Table 2.1: First Three Years of Predictive Health Status Distributions when
t0 = 0.
Therefore, using the UKF, we can fully define the posterior distribution by two parameters:
the mean and the variance. At each iteration, the algorithm takes the estimated mean and
variance of a plan member’s health status from the previous year and the loss in the current
year to estimate the mean and variance of the plan member’s health status in the current
year. For example, the first iteration of the UKF requires three starting values: the mean
and variance estimates of the year t0 unconditional health status distribution, which can
be found in Equation (2.4), and the loss amount in year t0 + 1. Based on these inputs, the
algorithm then estimates the health status distribution in year t0 + 1 by estimating the
posterior mean (which we denote as h̃t0+1,j) and posterior variance (which we denote as
ρ2t0+1,j). Finally, the actuary predicts the plan member’s distribution of true health status in
the upcoming year as a normal distribution with mean h̃t0+1,j−λ and variance ρ2t0+1,j +σ
2.
The second iteration then uses h̃t0+1,j , ρ2t0+1,j and the loss amount in year t0 +2 to calculate
the posterior mean and variance estimates of the year t0+2 health status distribution. Based
on these new estimates, which we denote as h̃t0+2,j and ρt0+2,j , respectively, the actuary
can then predict the plan member’s year t0 +3 health status distribution as a normal distri-
bution with mean h̃t0+2,j − λ and variance ρ2t0+2,j + σ
2. Throughout the years, the actuary
refines and updates these mean and variance estimates as new annual loss amounts are
observed, so that the approximated health status distributions become increasingly precise
through time.13 Table 2.1 illustrates the process of updating these parameter estimates in
the first three years.
This means we can approximate H̃t,j as a normal distribution with mean h̃t−1,j − λ and
standard deviation
√








13For more details about the UKF, refer to Appendix A.2.
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where the symbol ∼̇ denotes an approximate distribution. Using this conditional distribution
of Ht,j , we can now estimate the conditional distribution of Ht,j based on the relationship
between the Ht,j and the Ht,j models from Equation (2.6):
Ht,j |Ht,j = h ∼ N (h, δ). (2.10)
We have shown how the distributions of the latent variables Ht,j and Ht,j can be approx-
imated. Next, we show how we can transform these into approximate distributions of the
mean annual loss parameters.
Let µ̃t,j be the transformation of H̃t,j based on the link function in Equation (2.5). Then
we can approximate µ̃t,j by a lognormal distribution with parameters as follows:
µ̃t,j ∼̇ logN
(





where the first and second parameters represent the mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding normal distributions.
It then follows from Equations (2.5) and (2.10) that the estimated distribution of the plan
member’s perceived mean loss parameter given a true parameter value of v is
µt,j |µt,j = v ∼ logN (ln v, βt,1δ). (2.12)
The above approximate distributions of the mean annual loss parameters allow the actuary
to estimate the annual loss and member selection models. The next subsection outlines how
our pricing method incorporates these two models to calculate optimal deposit rates.
2.4.2 A Constrained Optimization Problem
We use the actuarial equivalence principle of premium calculations as a starting point to
construct the objective of our pricing problem. Under the equivalence principle, Dt should
be chosen so that the expected annual deposit amount for each option is the expected an-
nual claims in that option.14 In other words, the cash inflow should breakeven with the cash
outflow in each option’s ASO deposit account.15
14We assume for simplicity that the loading factor is zero, but the calculations can easily be extended to
incorporate positive loading factors.
15We assume that all incurred claims are immediately reported, so that there is no float requirement.
13
The total amount deposited into an option’s ASO account depends on the number of plan
members in that option and therefore the plan members’ selections given Dt. Meanwhile,
the total cash outflow of the account depends both on the mix of plan members selecting























1{St,j (Dt,µt,j )=k}r(Lt,j , k)
∣∣∣∣∣ L1:t−1,j
]
, ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}.
However, this system may not have a solution given the complexity of these equations
with respect to Dt. Therefore, we relax it into a multi-objective optimization problem.
Specifically, we minimize the squared difference between the expected total deposits and
the expected total claims in each option. Assuming an equal importance of minimizing the
said objective for each option, we further combine the set of objectives into one function





















1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
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1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]





1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]





1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]
× fLt,j |µt,j (l | v)fµt,j |µt,j (u | v)fµ̃t,j (v) dv du dl.
14
The loss density, fLt,j |µt,j (l | v), is assumed to be known, while the densities fµt,j |µt,j (u | v)
and fµ̃t,j (v) can be computed based on Equations (2.11) and (2.12), respectively.
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Without a constraint, the optimal solution to the above optimization problem may result
in at least one option with zero expected enrollment.17 Since this defeats the purpose of
offering a flex plan to members, we introduce a constraint to eliminate any such impractical
solutions.
Including a constraint also serves as an opportunity to help guide plan members to make a
wise decision. While the enrollment choices ultimately lie with plan members, it is typically
ideal for plan members to select coverage levels that correspond to their loss levels. That is,
we want high risk members to choose a high coverage option so that in the event of a large
loss, they will not find themselves underinsured. Thus, we allocate members into K groups
ex ante based on the actuary’s estimates of each member’s expected annual loss, where
group Gt,k contains nk members with expected loss within some predetermined range, and∑K
k=1 nk = N . For example, the plan sponsor may prefer an equal number of plan members
in each option, so that the end points of the kth predetermined range are the k−1K
th and kK
th
percentiles of the annual loss estimates.18 Although these allocations only represent what
the actuary hopes to be the plan members’ actual choice, we can implement the constraint
below to maximize the chance that these hypothetical allocations are realized:
arg max
k′∈{1,2,...,K}
P(St,j(Dt, µt,j |L1:t−1,j) = k′) = k, ∀j ∈ Gt,k, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
That is, based on the approximate distributions of {µt,j}Nj=1, the actuary can select deposit
rates that maximize the probability that a plan member j’s selected option, k′, is in fact
the actuary’s intended option, k. However, considering the amount of complexity the above
constraint adds to the optimization problem and the fact that these allocations merely act
as guides built into the deposit rates when the enrollment decisions ultimately lie with plan
members, we propose a simpler, more practical constraint:
St,j(Dt,E[µt,j |L1:t−1,j ]) = k, ∀j ∈ Gt,k, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
16Note that the fLt,j ,µt,j |L1:t−1,j ,µt,j in the third line above is equivalent to fLt,j ,µt,j |µt,j in the fourth
line since µt,j contains more information than L1:t−1,j . This density is split into a product of fLt,j |µt,j and
fµt,j |µt,j in the fifth line since Lt,j and µt,j are independent when conditioned on µt,j .
17For example, there exist trivial solutions of Dt so that all plan members select the same option, leaving
other options with no enrollment.
18Note that the choice of {nk}Kk=1 will affect the expected annual change in ASO account balance; therefore,
keeping the total ASO account balance as close to zero as possible through time requires selecting a specific
rather than an arbitrary set of {nk}Kk=1. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
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In this proposed constraint, the approximate distributions of {µt,j}Nj=1 are replaced by
their expectations, making the selection functions deterministic and therefore ensuring the
feasibility of computing the constrained optimization problem. Combining the objective












1{St,j (Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]
fLt,j |µt,j (l | v)fµt,j |µt,j (u | v)fµ̃t,j (v) dv du dl
)2
(2.14)
subject to St,j(Dt,E[µt,j |L1:t−1,j ]) = k, ∀j ∈ Gt,k, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, where j ∈ Gt,k
if E[µ̃t,j ] is within some predetermined range, and the mutually exclusive sets Gt,k span
{1, ..., N} so that Gt,k ∩Gt,k′ = ∅, ∀k 6= k′, and ∪Kk=1Gt,k = {1, ..., N}.
2.5 Tying the Components Together Through the Annual
Cycle of a Flex Plan
Notation Description
Ht,j True health status of plan member j in year t
Ht,j
Plan member j’s intuition at the end of year t− 1 about their health status in the
upcoming year
H̃t,j Actuary’s estimator of plan member j’s health status in year t
h̃t,j
Mean of the actuary’s approximated distribution of plan member j’s health status
in year t
ρt,j
Variance of the actuary’s approximated distribution of plan member j’s health
status in year t
H
(unc)
t,j Unconditional distribution of plan member j’s health status in year t
µt,j True expected annual loss of plan member j in year t
µt,j Plan member j’s expectation of their annual loss in year t
µ̃t,j Actuary’s expectation of plan member j’s annual loss in year t
Lt,j Plan member j’s annual loss in year t
St,j Plan member j’s selected option in year t
Dt Deposit rates in year t
K Number of options in the flex plan
Gt,k Actuary’s anticipated group of plan members enrolled in option k in year t
N Number of plan members in the flex plan
nk Actuary’s intended number of plan members enrolled in option k
Table 2.2: Table of Notations.
We have now outlined each of the four pieces of our framework: the plan design, which forms
the structure of a flex plan, and three main components—the claims model, selections model,
and the pricing method—which correspond to the three main events in the annual cycle of
a flex plan:
1. At the end of year t−1 the actuary prices each option’s deposit rates for an upcoming
year. Specifically, the pricing actuary estimates each plan member’s distribution of
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health status and option selection in year t given their losses up to and including
year t − 1. This information is then used to set year t deposit rates, which are then
communicated to the plan members.
2. Given the rates, the plan members each select a coverage option for the upcoming
year t.
3. Finally, throughout the benefit year (i.e., year t), as each plan member’s losses are
reported, claims (and associated administrative fees) are withdrawn from the ASO
account based on each employee’s selected option. Deposits are also regularly paid
into the same account. The actuary then uses the individual annual loss amounts to
calculate the subsequent year’s deposit rates, initiating the next annual cycle of a flex
plan.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the relationship between the various parts of the framework. For ease
of communicating the pieces of each component, we have temporarily adopted the notations
Ĥt,j and µ̂t,j to represent the actuary’s approximations of the perceived health status and
the perceived mean loss parameter. These notations each combine two steps done in the
deposit rate calculations; µ̂t,j is an implied quantity found by integrating the distribution
of µt,j |µt,j in Equation (2.12) over the approximate µ̃t,j distribution in Equation (2.11).
Likewise, Ĥt,j , which is included in the diagram for completion, is an implied quantity that
can be found by integrating the distribution of Ht,j |Ht,j in Equation (2.10) over the ap-
proximate H̃t,j distribution in Equation (2.9). For convenience, we have also included Table


























































































We conduct a simulation study to compare the performance of a flex plan priced using
our proposed formula against the same plan priced with the traditional practice. In addi-
tion, since we are interested in eliminating adverse selection—which requires asymmetric
information—we also compare the plan’s dynamics under various information sets when
priced using our proposed formula. Finally, to test the robustness of our proposed method,
we repeat the simulation study using various alternative parameters. In this chapter, we
outline our assumptions and simulation methodology, and in the next chapter we present
our key findings.
3.1 Assumptions
3.1.1 Base Case Parameters
We consider a hypothetical group benefit with K = 2 options: “low coverage” and “high
coverage.” The low coverage option has a deductible of $25, a coinsurance rate of 50%, and a
coinsurance maximum of $2,500. The high coverage option has no deductible, a coinsurance
rate of 90%, and a coinsurance maximum of $2,000. In addition, both options have an
overall maximum of $1,000,000. The plan sponsor provides F = $500 in flex credits, and
any excess unused amount can be either cashed out or used towards a group retirement or
savings plan. In other words, we have the following plan design parameters:
• [d1, c1, CM1, OM1] = [$25, 50%, $2,500, $1,000,000],
• [d2, c2, CM2, OM2] = [$0, 90%, $2,000, $1,000,000], and
• s = 0%.
We study this flex plan for T = 15 years.
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We set up a hypothetical group of N = 400 plan members with stationary group demo-
graphics. Specifically, we assume that all plan members join the group at age 25 and retire
at age 64, so that at any point in time, we have 10 members of each age from 25 to 64. This
is to remove any demographic change effects from our results. These plan members’ utility
functions are assumed to be exponential, with a constant absolute risk aversion parameter.
We also assume that all plan members have the same constant annual salary of wt,j =
$50,000 over time so that our calculations will be net of any inflationary effects. Therefore,
the functions and parameters related to the option selection model are:
ut,j(c) = −e−Rt,jc, ∀ t, j,
where Rt,j = 0.00125.19
We assume that in any year t, the health statuses of 25-year-old plan members are normally
distributed with a mean of H(p)t,25 = 100 units and a standard deviation of ζ = 1 unit. We
can interpret 100 health units as a convenient reference point for our health scale, much like
the boiling and freezing points for water in a Celsius temperature scale. We further assume
that each plan member’s health status deteriorates at an average rate of λ = 1 unit per
year, subject to a normally distributed random term with a standard deviation of σ = 0.5
units. In our simulations, our plan members have an intuition of their upcoming year’s true
health status, subject to a normally distributed estimation error with standard deviation
δ = 1.
Each plan member’s loss distribution is assumed to be gamma with a known rate param-
eter, β = 0.1, that is constant for all plan members and through time. The link function
parameters, which depend on the health status scale, are assumed to be constant through
time so that we eliminate the impact of any health cost trends from our results. For our
simulations we have βt,0 = 13 and βt,1 = −0.1. This means, for example, that a plan mem-
ber with a health status of 100 units will have an expected annual loss of e13−0.1(100) = $20,
while a plan member with a health status of 61 units will have an expected annual loss of
e13−0.1(61) = $992. We assume that the most recent three years’ annual losses incurred at
or after age 25 are available by individual; that is, t0 + 1 = −2.20
Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter values used in the simulation study.
19This is a representative value among absolute risk aversion parameters found in the literature (Babcock
et al., 1993)






[d1, c1, CM1, OM1] [$25, 50%, $2,500, $1,000,000]
[d2, c2, CM2, OM2] [$0, 90%, $2,000, $1,000,000]
T 15
N 400














Table 3.1: Summary of Parameter Values in the Simulation Study.
3.1.2 Robustness Test Settings
To test the robustness of our model, we repeat each set of simulations nine times in addition
to the base case under alternative parameters, as outlined in the list of alternative settings
below.
• Changes in Plan Design
1. Decrease the Difference in Coverage Between The Two Options
– We decrease the difference in coverage between the two options by changing
the coinsurance levels from c1 = 50% and c2 = 90% to c1 = 65% and
c2 = 80%.
2. Increase the Number of Options
– We add a third option—“Medium Coverage”—with a deductible of 0, coin-
surance of 75%, coinsurance maximum of $2,500, and an overall maximum of
$1,000,000. To have equal intended enrollment levels in each of the three op-
tions, we change the group size to N = 360 so that the intended enrollment
levels are n1 = n2 = n3 = 120. We also maintain a stationary population,
with nine plan members of each age between 25 and 64.
• Changes in Group Size
3. Decrease in Group Size
21
– We maintain a stationary population but decrease the group size from 400
to 200 so that there are five plan members of each age between 25 and 64.
4. Increase in Group Size
– We maintain a stationary population but increase the group size from 400
to 600 so that there are fifteen plan members of each age between 25 and 64.
• Changes in Premium Subsidy Arrangement
5. Replace Flex Credits with Moderate Level of Percent Premium Subsidy
– We replace flex credits with a 50% premium subsidy arrangement.
6. Replace Flex Credits with High Level of Percent Premium Subsidy
– We replace flex credits with a 75% premium subsidy arrangement.
• Changes in Intended Enrollment Levels
7. Change in Intended Enrollment Levels
– We change the ex ante option allocation from n1 = n2 = 200 to n1 = 300
and n2 = 100.
8. Change in Both the Intended Enrollment Levels and Premium Subsidy Arrange-
ment
– We change the ex ante option allocation from n1 = n2 = 200 to n1 = 300
and n2 = 100. In addition, we also replace flex credits with a 75% premium
subsidy arrangement.
9. Change in Both the Number of Options and Intended Enrollment Proportions
– We add a third option as described in Robustness Test 2 above, but with a
group size of N = 400 so that the intended enrollment levels are n1 = 134
and n2 = n3 = 133.
3.2 Simulation Methodology
We simulate 10,000 paths of true health statuses, annual losses, and members’ perceived
health statuses based on the models and parameters described in the previous sections, and
analyze the distribution of deposit rates, enrollment figures, and ASO account balances of
the flex plan under various settings.
Specifically, for each of the 10,000 paths, we generate 18 years’ true health statuses (i.e.,
{Ht,j}15t=−2) for members j = 1, 2, ..., 400. From each of these simulated health statuses, plan
members’ perceived health statuses (i.e., {Ht,j}15t=1) and annual losses (i.e., {Lt,j}15t=−2) are
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generated for each member j = 1, 2, ..., 400.21 We then simulate the evolution of the 15 year
benefit plan from year 1 to year 15 for each of the 10,000 paths under each setting.
3.2.1 Calculating Deposit Rates Under the Traditional Pricing Practice
Under the traditional pricing practice, we assume that the actuary’s estimate of the group’s
annual losses in the upcoming year is equal to the group’s observed losses in the current
year.22 As we wish to observe the start of any adverse selection spiral, we assume the flex
plan is not implemented until year 1, meaning no prior option selection data are available.
Therefore, the actuary initially assumes that the 200 members with lower estimated losses
will select the low coverage option, and that the remaining 200 members will select the high
coverage option. Each upcoming year’s deposit rates are then set to be equal to the current
year’s per capita claims within each option.
3.2.2 Calculating Deposit Rates Using Our Proposed Pricing Method
We also simulate the flex plan evolution with deposit rates calculated based on our proposed
method outlined in Section 2. Considering the long computing time required to simulate a
large number of potential flex plan dynamics, we streamline the optimizations by approxi-
mating the distributions of both the plan members’ perceived mean loss (i.e., µt,j) and the
true mean loss (i.e., µt,j) with the point estimate E[µ̃t,j ] when calculating deposit rates.






































and that our constraint becomes
St,j(Dt,E[µt,j |L1:t−1,j ]) = k
≈St,j(Dt,E[µt,j |L1:t−1,j ]) = k
21Only 15, 16, and 17 years’ true health statuses and annual losses were generated for members aged 25,
26, or 27 in year 1, respectively, since we treat historical data prior to age 25 as unavailable.
22In practice, the actuary’s estimate of the upcoming year’s losses is equal to the previous year’s losses
multiplied by one plus a trend factor. As previously mentioned, the trend factor is assumed to be always
zero in our study.
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=St,j(Dt,E[µ̃t,j ]) = k, ∀j ∈ Gt,k, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
These approximations reduce the problem into a quadratic optimization and even yield a
closed-form solution in the two-options case. This significantly improves the efficiency of
running the simulations while producing very similar deposit rates compared to the full
proposed optimization problem in Equation (2.14).23 As will be shown in Section 4, this
also turns out to be a good approximation in terms of meeting our four goals.
The point estimate E[µ̃t,j ] is calculated based on the distribution of µ̃t,j , which is estimated
using the UKF algorithm as explained in Section 2. The UKF parameters used in our sim-
ulation can be found in Appendix A.2.
The groups Gt,k are chosen so that an equal number of plan members are hypothetically
allocated to each option ex ante.
3.2.3 Closed Form Solution in the Two-Options Case
Recall that for our simulation study, we have the following assumptions:
• plan member j’s losses in year t follow a gamma distribution with a rate parameter
of β and a shape parameter of αt,j = µt,jβ, ∀ t, j,
• plan member j’s utility function is ut,j(c) = −e−Rt,jc, ∀ t, j, and
• the reimbursement function of option k is as defined in Equation (2.1).
Given these special case assumptions, a closed-form solution to our proposed pricing formula
is available if each plan members’ true health statuses are known to both the actuary and
the member.
Proposition 1. Let the special case assumptions hold. Then plan member j’s expected total
claim amount during year t is
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23We have simulated one 15-year flex plan evolution and found almost identical results between calculating
deposit rates using the full proposed optimization problem and the approximated version.
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+OMk[1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αt,j , β)],
where FL(l;α, β) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a gamma distribution with
shape parameter α and rate parameter β, evaluated at point l.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.1
Proposition 2. Let the special case assumptions hold and assume that each plan members’
true health statuses are known to both the actuary and the member. Then the constraint in
the pricing optimization problem can be simplified to
LBt ≤ Dt,2 −Dt,1 ≤ UBt,
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e−OMkRt,j [1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αt,j , β +Rt,j)].
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.3.
Intuitively, if the cost difference between enrolling in the low and high coverage options
is within the bounds, then a portion of the plan members are willing to choose the more
expensive option for increased coverage. However, when the cost to upgrade to the high
coverage option exceeds a certain upper bound, then at least one of the plan members
intended by the actuary to select the high coverage option will no longer find it worthwhile
to do so. Similarly, when the cost to upgrade to the high coverage option is low enough, then
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at least one of the plan members allocated to Gt,1 will choose the more expensive option
instead.
Proposition 3. Let the special case assumptions hold and assume that each plan members’
true health statuses are known to both the actuary and the member. Then the closed-form
solution to our deposit rate calculation formula is
Dt =

DLBt = [DLBt,1 , DLBt,2 ] if D∗t,2 −D∗t,1 < LBt
D∗t = [D∗t,1, D∗t,2] if LBt ≤ D∗t,2 −D∗t,1 ≤ UBt
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∑
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DUBt,2 =UBt +DUBt,1 ,
and LBt, UBt, and EC(αt,j , k) are as defined in the previous propositions.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.4.
Note that the solution D∗t is the set of average expected claim amounts for the two options.
Using this set of deposit rates means there is no built-in cross subsidy across the options,
which is the most ideal scenario. However, if this solution is not feasible, meaning it does
not yield the desired enrollment levels in each option, then this set of rates is adjusted to
either DLBt or DUBt . Specifically, the low coverage option is modified to a weighted aver-
age of the original rate, D∗1, and an “appropriately distanced” rate of either D∗2 − LBt or
D∗2 −UBt, where the weights are proportional to the squared intended number of members
in each group. The cost difference between the low and high coverage option rates are then
adjusted to a specific amount—LBt or UBt.
We therefore obtain a closed-form solution to the approximate pricing formula stated in
Section 3.2.2 by replacing αt,j = µt,jβ with α̃t,j = E[µ̃t,j ]β, ∀ t, j in Equation (3.1).
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3.2.4 Simplification of Our Proposed Approximate Formula when K ≥ 3
While it is tedious to obtain a closed form solution when there are are more than two
options, under the special case assumptions we can still efficiently simulate a large number
of potential flex plan dynamics by treating our constrained optimization problem as a
quadratic optimization problem. That is, if each plan member’s true health status is known
to both the actuary and the plan member, we can simplify the objective function and rewrite
it in matrix form as follows:
1
2Dt
TQDt + vtTDt, (3.2)
where
• Q is a K ×K diagonal matrix with entry qk,k = 2n2k,
• v is a size K column vector with entry vk = −2nk
∑
j∈Gt,k EC(αt,j , k), and
• nk is the number of plan members enrolled in option k, as defined in Section 2.4.2.
Extending the derivations in Appendix B.3, we can write the constraint in the form
ADt ≤ bt,
















































The approximate pricing formula stated in Section 3.2.2 can then be simplified in the three
options case by replacing αt,j = µt,jβ with α̃t,j = E[µ̃t,j ]β, ∀ t, j, in Equations (3.2), (3.3)
and (3.4).
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3.2.5 Calculating Manual Rates Using Our Proposed Pricing Method
In addition to the realistic information setting where neither the actuary nor the plan
members know the true health statuses, we also simulate the flex plan dynamics under other
information sets to evaluate the effect of available information on the flex plan evolution.24
One such information set used is the manual rate setting. Using the manual rate as deposit
rates refers to the case where the UKF is not applied to track each plan member’s health
status. That is, the actuary would use the unconditional density of µ(unc)t,j = e
βt,0+βt,1H(unc)t,j
in place of µ̃t,j in the pricing formula:
E
[








1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]









1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]
× fLt,j ,µt,j (l, u|µt,j = v)fµ(unc)t,j





1{St,j(Dt,u)=k} (Dt,k − r(l, k))
]
× fLt,j (l|µt,j = v)fµt,j (u|µt,j = v)fµ(unc)t,j
(v) dv du dl.
With the approximation explained in the Section 3.2.2, this means that the unconditional
expected losses, E[µ(unc)t,j ] is used in place of E[µ̃t,j ] to calculate the deposit rates, so that



























= k, ∀j ∈ Gt,k, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.










, are static through time, then the resulting
manual rates are constant through time as well.
24We list all the simulated information sets in the next chapter.
28
Chapter 4
Simulation Study: Key Findings
We evaluate the performance of flex plans based on how close the plan is to reaching the
four goals related to option enrollment, ASO account balance, and deposit rates as listed
in Chapter 1.
4.1 Simulated Results Under the Traditional Pricing Prac-
tice
Under the traditional pricing practice, we observe skyrocketing rates, especially for the high
coverage option, which becomes obsolete within three years in all 10,000 of our simulated
scenarios. Note that this result is consistent with the fate of Harvard University’s employee
flex plan mentioned in Chapter 1.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the distribution of deposit rates evolve, increasing from between
$390 and $477 in year 1 to between $863 and $1,456 in year 2 in the simulated scenarios. By
year 3, the high coverage option is driven out in most of the scenarios. Of the 471 remaining
cases, the deposit rate further increases to a range of $1,422 to $3,747, at which point no
plan member remains in the high coverage option in any of our simulated scenarios. This
adverse selection spiral is expected, as we assume that all plan members have an accurate
enough estimate of their loss distribution and diligently select the option that maximizes
their utilities.
Unsurprisingly, in all of our simulated scenarios, the accumulated account balance plunges
as the deposit rates try but fail to catch up to the skyrocketing average claims in the first
three years, and the balance stays negative thereafter. Clearly, the flex plan priced under













































Evolution of High Coverage Deposit Rates
Traditional Pricing Method
Figure 4.1: Evolution of High Coverage Deposit Rates Under the Traditional
Pricing Method.
4.2 Simulated Results Under Our Proposed Pricing Method
Contrary to the flex plan dynamics observed when the traditional pricing practice is applied,
our proposed pricing formula keeps the flex plan stable and sustainable, outperforming the
plan priced under the traditional practice in terms of each of the four goals:
1. The first goal of having no empty enrollment in any option is satisfied each year
in all 10,000 of our simulated scenarios under our proposed pricing method. This
is an expected result; the constraint in our optimization problem ensures that if the
actuary has an accurate estimate of the plan members’ perceived health statuses, then
nk members enroll in option k. In fact, the distribution of option selection is stable, as
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that we only show the low coverage option enrollment
since it implies that the remaining plan members are enrolled in the high coverage
option.
2. The distribution of the total ASO account balance is centred close to zero over time,
as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Note that this second goal of having a year-end total ASO
account balance as close to zero as possible each year means having a net annual
change in total ASO account balance as close to zero as possible. While this objective
is not the same as the one in our proposed optimization problem, they are highly
related. Recall that our proposed objective in Equation (2.13) was constructed based
on relaxing the optimal goal of having a zero balance in each option’s ASO account. If
30
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Out of 400 Members
Evolution of Low Option Enrollment
Information Set 4
Figure 4.2: Evolution of Low Coverage Option Enrollment Distribution Under
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Evolution of Account Balance
Information Set 4
Figure 4.3: Evolution of ASO Account Balance Distribution Under the Proposed
Pricing Formula.
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each option’s ASO account balance is zero, then the sum of account balances in each
option is also zero. Likewise, if each option’s squared ASO account balance is zero,
then we also have a total ASO account balance of zero.
It turns out that having a total ASO account balance centred close to zero over time
is a result of our equal allocation of plan members into the two options. Not only is
it a natural choice, but it also leads to an expected total ASO account balance of
exactly zero under the theoretical limiting case where both the actuary and the plan
members know the true health statuses, as stated in Proposition 4 below. Under our
realistic information setting, where the actuary and plan members can only estimate
the true health statuses, this proposition acts as a useful guide.
Proposition 4. Let the special case assumptions made in Propositions 1 to 3 hold and
also assume that each plan members’ true health statuses are known to both the actuary
and the member. Then the expected total ASO account balance is zero if n1 = n2.
Proof. Refer to Appendix B.5.
Interestingly, pricing a flex plan using our proposed formula yields a cross subsidy
between the two options each year in all 10,000 of our simulated scenarios. In other
words, the case LBt ≤ D∗t,2−D∗t,1 ≤ UBt from Equation (3.1)—in which deposit rates
equal the average of members’ expected claim amounts in an option—is not satisfied
in any of our simulations. Instead, in our simulations the low coverage deposit rates
are between $147 and $221 above the average expected claim amount in that option,
while the high coverage deposit rates are set between $131 and $207 below the average
expected claim amount in that option. Figure 4.4 shows an example of the deposit
rate and expected claims in one of the simulated paths of the flex plan. Note that this
finding supports Cave’s (1985) theoretical results regarding cross subsidy mentioned
in Chapter 1.
3. In all of the scenarios simulated under our proposed pricing formula, the change in
the ASO account balance through time is minimal in comparison with total annual
deposits, which range between approximately $80,000 and $100,000 over the 15 years
in each simulated path. As shown in Figure 4.5, in each year, over half of the 10,000
paths experience less than $1,000 in year-to-year account balance change, and almost
all paths experience less than $3,000 change in account balance in any given year. The
average of these annual changes in ASO account balance is also close to zero, ranging
from -$49 to -$20 through the 15 simulated years. This is a direct result of our choice
of n1 and n2, as explained in the second point above. Again, the fact that the range













Expected High Option Claims
Expected Low Option Claims
High Option Rates
Low Option Rates
Expected Per Capita Claims and Deposit Rates
Figure 4.4: Example of the Cross Subsidy Effect Observed in One Sample Path.
plan members only have an estimate of the true health status.
In fact, even if we have n1 6= n2, we still expect the annual change in total ASO
account balance to be constant (albeit non-zero) through time.25
4. The deposit rates are stable from year to year. As shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7,
about half of the year-over-year rate changes are within 1% for both the high and low
coverage options, and almost all of the year-over-year changes are within 3%.
This observation is again not surprising; a careful examination of Equation (2.14) re-
veals that having constant expected deposit rates is just a by-product of our proposed
pricing formula if the group’s set of expected health costs is constant through time.
Hypothetically, if the unordered set {µ̃t,j}Nj=1 is static through time, then the opti-
mization problem and therefore the calculated deposit rates solution is also constant
each year. Similar to our explanation in Point 3 above, although this theoretical condi-
tion cannot be achieved in a realistic setting (except when we are pricing with manual
rates), our stationary population and static relationship between a health status and
the expected loss yields a reasonable approximation. In our simulations, the distri-
25Recall that our population demographics is stationary and the relationship between health status and
expected losses is static over time. Therefore, we expect the unordered set {E[µ̃t,j ]}Nj=1—which is used to
approximate {µt,j}Nj=1—to be constant over the years. Hypothetically, if the unordered set {µt,j}Nj=1 is
constant over time, then so is the unordered set {αt,j}Nj=1, meaning the calculated values in Equations (B.2)
























Distribution of Year−to−Year Change in Account Balance
























Distribution of High Coverage Percentage Rate Changes

























Distribution of Low Coverage Percentage Rate Changes
Figure 4.7:Distribution of Year-to-Year Percent Change in Low Coverage Deposit
Rates.
butions {µ̃t,j}Nj=1 are approximated by their expectations, {E[µ̃t,j ]}Nj=1; therefore, our
simulated year-to-year volatility in deposit rates is dictated by the year-to-year change
in the set of estimated mean losses. Given our stationary population assumption, this
volatility is small.
4.3 Effect of Information
We compare the flex plans under various information sets to examine the effect of informa-
tion on the plan dynamics. Table 4.1 summarizes the different information sets used in our
simulation study, and Figure 4.8 illustrates the relative level of information between the
different settings. As indicated in the table, Information Set 4 is the realistic case, which
we have shown results for in the previous section. The theoretical limiting case, which was
referenced in the previous section, is Information Set 1.
4.3.1 Actuary’s Information
A comparison of the flex plan evolution under Information Sets 2, 4, 5, and 6 can reveal
the importance of the actuary’s accuracy in estimating the health status distribution. We
find that even if the actuary knows the true health status, the results only show a negligible
improvement. For example, as shown in Figure 4.11, under Information Set 2, the variability
in the final ASO account balance distribution only marginally improves when compared to
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Table 4.1: Description of Various Information Sets.






































No Prior Claims Data
Information Set 6
Manual Rates
Figure 4.8: Information Sets Ordered by Level of Information.
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data prior to the flex plan implementation does not have much of a negative impact on the
plan performance. The only notable impact is a temporary instability in deposit rates in
the first couple of years under Information Set 5 as the deposit rates adjust from manual
rates of $185.24 and $259.15 in the first year to adapted rates based on observed losses.
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High Coverage Deposit Rates Evolution
Information Set 5
Figure 4.9: Distribution of High Coverage Deposit Rates Under Information Set
5.
In the interest of deposit rate stability, it may be tempting to use manual rates since they
are constant through time given our assumptions; however, this deviation from our sugges-
tion of tracking health statuses drastically increases the variance of the final ASO account
balance, as already shown in the Figure 4.11. Plan sponsors likely do not view this as a
sensible trade-off.
4.3.2 Members’ Information
We also examined the effect of plan members’ accuracy in predicting their health status by
comparing Information Sets 3 and 4.26 Our results show that such a change has negligible
26The case where the members’ uncertainty about their health statuses is large is less relevant as the
members need to have a good intuition about their health to create the potential for adverse selection and
hence the spiral. We have confirmed via simulation that the adverse selection spiral does not occur under
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Low Coverage Deposit Rates Evolution
Information Set 5















































Distribution of Accumulated Account Balance at End of Year 15
Figure 4.11: Final ASO Account Balance at the End of Year 15 Under Varying
























































Distribution of Accumulated Account Balance at End of Year 15
Figure 4.12: Final ASO Account Balance at the End of Year 15 Under Varying
Information Settings for the Members.
impact on the flex plan dynamics. As shown in Figure 4.12, the final ASO account balance
is slightly more negative in the case of Information Set 3, where plan members have the ad-
vantage of knowing their true health status in the upcoming year. Again, considering that
the total annual deposits range between approximately $80,000 and $100,000, this small
downward shift in the final ASO account balance distribution is likely immaterial from plan
sponsors’ perspective. Otherwise, the distribution of option enrollment is extremely similar
to that of the realistic information setting (i.e., Information Set 4), and the deposit rates
are unaffected by the change in plan members’ knowledge of their health status since the
pricing formula depends solely on the information known to the actuary.
4.3.3 Theoretical Limiting Case: Perfect Information Setting
In addition, we test the flex plan under Information Set 1 to examine whether the simu-
lated results align with the theoretical derivations. For example, the cross subsidy observed
under the realistic information setting (i.e., Information Set 4) was such that the difference
between the deposit rates and expected claims in the low coverage option approximately
offsets that of the high coverage option. Under Information Set 1, we observe an exact off-
set, with the expected ASO sub-account balance ranging from $145.40 to $196.17 in the low
coverage option and from -$196.17 and -$145.40 in the high coverage option.
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Also, as expected, we observe the lowest variance in option enrollment in this theoretical
limiting case, where both the actuary and the plan members know the true health statuses.
Figure 4.13 compares the low option enrollment under various information sets. Note that
due to rounding, there are occasional cases where the low option enrollment level is not
exactly n1 = 200, even in this perfect information setting.27 Nonetheless, we observe in
Figure 4.14 that the ASO balance distribution is not sensitive to this rounding detail under
any of the main information sets. Note that this insensitivity to the small deviation from
the optimal setting of n1 = n2 is an important and desirable property, since in practice we
cannot ensure that a group size is always divisible by the number of options.
Finally, under Information Set 1, 93% and 81% of the high and low coverage year-to-year
deposit rate changes are within 2%, respectively. Compared to the realistic information
setting, where 90% and 78% of the high and low coverage year-to-year deposit rate changes
are within 2%, we find only a slight improvement in deposit rate stability. In conclusion,
the flex plan performs well enough in the realistic information setting; improved accuracy
about health statuses does not have any significant impact on any of the plan dynamics.
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Out of 400 Members
Evolution of Low Option Enrollment
Information Set 1
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Out of 400 Members
Evolution of Low Option Enrollment
Information Set 2
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Out of 400 Members
Evolution of Low Option Enrollment
Information Set 3
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Out of 400 Members
Evolution of Low Option Enrollment
Information Set 4
Figure 4.13: Evolution of Low Coverage Option Enrollment Distribution Under
Various Information Settings.
27For example, there may exist two plan members whose rounded expected annual losses are both equal
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Evolution of Account Balance
Information Set 4
Figure 4.14: Evolution of Account Balances Under Various Information Settings.
4.4 Robustness Test Results
4.4.1 General Observations: Similar to the Base Case
In addition to investigating the effect of information on the plan performance, we also ex-
amine the robustness of our proposed formula by revising some parameters according to
the nine alternative settings outlined in Section 3.1.2. We find our proposed formula to
be robust in that no adverse selection spiral is observed in any of the simulated flex plan
settings when our pricing method is applied. In all of our simulated scenarios, both the
enrollment levels and deposit rates are stable through time. The ASO account balance is
also stable and centred around zero as long as appropriate anticipated enrollment figures
(i.e., {nk}Kk=1) are used in setting deposit rates, and the plan offers the typical premium
subsidy arrangement of flex credits instead of a level percent premium subsidy.
Most of our observations from the robustness tests are extremely similar to what we have
already shown in the graphs for the base case. For example, when the coinsurance levels are
adjusted, the plan dynamics behave almost identically to that of the base case, except the
average deposit rates reflect the change in coverage in each option. A change in group size
also results in findings similar to those shown in previous sections for the base case. Although
an increase in group size from 400 to 600 leads to a higher variability in the annual change in
total ASO account balance per dollar of annual deposits, the variability is still within reason.
Similarly, the deposit rate is slightly more volatile when the group size is decreased from
41
400 to 200, but still acceptable. Table 4.2 outlines some figures to show these small impacts.
Group Size
N = 200 N = 400 N = 600
Range of Net Annual Change
in ASO Account Balance, as a
Proportion of Annual Deposits
in the Simulated Scenarios
-3.6% to 3.6% -5.9% to 5.3% -7.9% to 7.3%
Proportion of
Year-to-Year Rate Changes
that are Within 2% in
the Simulated Scenarios
Low Coverage
Option 66% 82% 90%
High Coverage
Option 81% 93% 98%
Table 4.2: Impact of Group Size on Various Results.
4.4.2 Immaterial Constant Drift in ASO Account Balance
The only notable deviation from the base case dynamics arises when there is a change in
subsidy arrangement or when the intended enrollment levels are not equal in each option.
In these cases, even though we do not observe an adverse selection spiral, the ASO account
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Robustness Test 5: 50% Premium Subsidy
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Robustness Test 6: 75% Premium Subsidy
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Robustness Test 9: Three−Options Case 
with Alternative Intended Enrollment Levels
Evolution of Account Balance
Information Set 4
Figure 4.15: Evolution of Account Balances Under Robustness Tests 5, 6, and 9.
The three-options plan with slightly unequal intended enrollment levels (i.e., Robustness
Test 9, where n1 = 134 and n2 = n3 = 133) also experiences a similar magnitude of linear
drift in the total ASO account balance under both Information Sets 1 and 4. As this drift
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is absent when the intended enrollment levels are equal in each of the three options (i.e.,
Robustness Test 2, where n1 = n2 = n3 = 120), our conjecture is that the drift amount
is sensitive to a small but consistent deviation from the equal intended enrollment levels
condition. Nonetheless, the magnitude of this detectable drift is immaterial compared to
the annual deposit amounts. Also, the distribution of final account balance (i.e., at the end
of year 15) still covers a range of positive and negative values.
In short, we find that with appropriate intended enrollment levels, any detectable drift in the
ASO account balance distribution caused by rounding is immaterial. Figure 4.15 illustrates
the evolution of account balances in Robustness Tests 5, 6, and 9.
4.4.3 Significant Constant Drift in ASO Account Balance
We therefore run Robustness Tests 7 and 8 to evaluate the impact of choosing inappropriate
intended enrollment levels, based on the two-options plan. Under the more extreme setting
of n1 = 300 and n2 = 100, while the option enrollment and deposit rates are still stable, the
drift in the ASO account balance can be material over time. This is an expected outcome;
again using Equations (B.2) and (B.3) as an approximation for the ASO account balance
drift under the realistic information setting, we see that this choice of n1 and n2 drastically
increases the coefficient and therefore the drift by a factor of approximately 60 when com-
pared to our base case. In fact, in contrast to all the other robustness test results, these
drifts are so significant that the simulated final ASO account balances are either always
positive or always negative, as illustrated in Figure 4.16.
Recall that in practice, plan sponsors make lumpsum deposits or withdrawals to keep the
ASO account balance at a suitable level. Therefore, although it is not ideal to have a sig-
nificant linear drift in the ASO account balance, plan sponsors may still view the regular
account withdrawals or required replenishments as acceptable for budgeting purposes, as
they are predictable and expected to be constant each year. The alternative solution is
to eliminate or minimize such a drift by finding and implementing the optimal intended















































































































Robustness Test 7: Change in Intended Enrollment Levels














































































































Robustness Test 8: 75% Premium Subsidy with Change in Intended Enrollment Levels
Evolution of Account Balance
Information Set 4




Conclusions and Suggestions for
Further Research
Over the years, a number of solutions have been suggested or implemented to prevent ad-
verse selection in flex plans. Unfortunately, even though some of these fixes can be effective,
none of them are ideal or practical in the flexible group benefits context. A more suitable
solution to prevent the adverse selection spiral is through pricing. We therefore propose a
comprehensive flexible group benefits framework with a novel pricing method that incorpo-
rates a claim model and an option selection model. We present both theoretical derivations
and simulation study results to show that flex plans which are prone to the adverse selection
spiral under the traditional pricing practice can become sustainable if they are priced with
our proposed pricing formula instead. Specifically, our proposed method outperforms the
traditional method by keeping all plan options available, maintaining the year-end total
ASO account balance as close to zero and as stable as possible, and keeping deposit rates
as stable as possible through time.
In addition to constructing an effective and practical pricing formula, our project contributes
to the group benefits industry by proposing a comprehensive framework, which allows actu-
aries to better understand the dynamics and relationships between each component of a flex
plan. An interesting finding from our simulation study is that the ideal set of deposit rates
never equals the set of expected claims in each option, even though the total annual deposits
equal the total expected annual claims in a plan. In other words, a portion of the deposits
for an option subsidizes claims in another option, which is consistent with Cave’s (1985)
theoretical results.28 This suggests that having pure deposits rates equal to the expected
claims is at least difficult to achieve. It will therefore be helpful in future research to further
28In our context and given our simulation assumptions, this means that the case LBt ≤ D∗t,2−D∗t,1 ≤ UBt
is never satisfied in any of our simulated scenarios.
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analyze the relationship between the bounds and D∗ to better understand this phenomenon.
We have also shown that maintaining a sustainable ASO account balance requires choosing
a suitable set of intended enrollment levels for each plan option. Given the plan assump-
tions in our study, we theoretically derived and showed through simulations that the ideal
scenario of zero drift in ASO account balance is achieved when n1 = n2 in the two-options
setting. In future research, it will be interesting to derive a closed-form solution for deposit
rates and to confirm our conjecture that for the case of three or more options, it is still
optimal to choose equal intended enrollment levels in each option.
Other suggestions for further research are outlined below.
1. Extend the models in our proposed framework to account for more general flex plans.
For example:
• Having multiple lines of benefits with different reimbursement functions. This
will require that each plan member has multiple correlated health statuses for
each line of benefit.
• Allowing for dependents’ coverage. A simple way of incorporating family or cou-
ples coverage in addition to single coverage is to include a family status factor in
each individual’s health status.
• Allowing for the group size or group demographics to change each year.
2. Refine the proposed models. For example:
• Accounting for moral hazard in the claim model.
• Further dividing the risk classification groups in the health status model to in-
clude more variables in addition to age, such as gender and geographical location.
The health deterioration rate, λ, may also vary with age and through time; i.e.,
an x year old individual’s health deterioration rate in year t can be λt,x.
• Accounting for biased intuitions in each plan member’s estimate of their own
health status (i.e., whether particular individuals tend to be more optimistic
or pessimistic about their estimated health status), so that the mean of νt,j is
nonzero. The accuracy of intuition, δ, can also depend on the individual and
through time, so that we have δt,j as the variance of νt,j in Equation (2.6).
3. Explore alternative models within our framework. For example:
• Using an alternative objective function in the constrained optimization problem.
Examples include:
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– Minimizing the squared total ASO balance (which is the plan sponsor’s goal)
instead of the sum of squared individual sub-account balances (which is con-
structed based on relaxing the more ambitious goal of satisfying the actuarial
equivalence principle in every option).
– Minimizing the squared expected difference between the actual and target










• Changing the loss distribution, e.g., to a Tweedie distribution.
• Changing the utility function, e.g., to one with a constant relative risk aversion
level. That is,
ut,j =
[wt,j − (1− s)Dt,k + F + r(Lt,j)− Lt,j ]1−Rt,j
1−Rt,j
where Rt,j > 1.
• Using an alternative option selection model. Examples include:
– Introducing a random component to our proposed model. Appendix C out-
lines how the model can be extended.
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Appendix A
Proofs Related to Tracking Health
Statuses
A.1 Deriving the Conditional Density Recursion Formula
Using Bayes’ Rule
The following proof adapts Creal’s (2012) derivations to our notation in this report. For ease
of readability, the time index has been moved forward by one year compared to Equation
(2.8), and subscripts on the density functions have been omitted in the intermediate steps:
fHt,j |L1:t,j (ht,j |L1:t,j)
=f(L1:t,j , ht,j)
f(L1:t,j)
=f(Lt,j |ht,j , L1:t−1,j)f(ht,j |L1:t−1,j)f(L1:t−1,j)
f(L1:t,j)





= f(Lt,j |ht,j)f(ht,j |L1:t−1,j)∫
R f(Lt,j |ht,j , L1:t−1,j)f(ht,j |L1:t−1,j)dht,j
= f(Lt,j |ht,j)
∫
R f(ht,j |ht−1,j)f(ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j)dht−1,j∫
R f(Lt,j |ht,j , L1:t−1,j)
∫
R f(ht,j |ht−1,j)f(ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j)dht−1,jdht,j
=
∫
R fLt,j |Ht,j (Lt,j |ht,j)fHt|Ht−1(ht,j |ht−1,j)fHt−1,j |L1:t−1,j (ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j)dht−1,j∫
R
∫
R fLt,j |Ht,j (Lt,j |ht,j)fHt|Ht−1(ht,j |ht−1,j)fHt−1,j |L1:t−1,j (ht−1,j |L1:t−1,j)dht,jdht−1,j
.
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A.2 Unscented Kalman Filter
The unscented Kalman filter is an algorithm that tracks latent variables, given signals
observed in discrete time. The problem involves a nonlinear discrete-time dynamics system,
which consists of:
1. The dynamics of a latent variable (Ht,j in our case), written as a function of the
previous state of this latent variable (Ht−1,j) and the process noise (εt,j), and
2. The measurement function, which is the observed signal (Lt,j) written as a function
of the latent variable and a measurement noise (zt,j).
Our latent variable dynamics is stated in Equation (2.3). To rewrite the distribution of
observed losses as a measurement function, we introduce a random variable, zt,j , which
follows a standard normal distribution. Our measurement function is therefore
Lt,j = fmeasurement(Ht,j , zt,j) = f−1L (Φ(zt,j); g(Ht,j))
where
• f−1L (·) is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the annual loss,
• Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, and
• g(·) is the link function that transforms the health status into the mean parameter,
µt,j .
We restate the steps for one iteration of the unscented Kalman filter algorithm as outlined
in Wan and Van Der Merwe (2000), but adapted to our context where appropriate:
1. Begin the iteration with the previous mean and variance estimates (i.e., h̃t−1,j and
ρ2t−1,j , respectively) of the approximated health status distribution, as well as the new
observed signal (i.e., Lt,j).
2. Construct a column vector x̂at−1 of the means of the previous latent variable estimate,
the process noise, and the measurement noise. Moreover, create a diagonal matrix
P at−1 of the variances of the estimated latent variable distribution, process noise, and
measurement noise. Given that our process noise is εt,j ∼ N (0, σ) and our measure-




 and P at−1 =
ρ2t−1,j 0 00 σ2 0
0 0 1
 .
3. Calculate the previous year’s sigma points, which are representative points in the





(L+ λUKF )P at−1 x̂at−1 x̂at−11> +
√














where 1 is a size-three column vector of ones. The row vectors χ(h)t−1, χ
(pn)
t−1 , and χ
(mn)
t−1
are the sigma points for the distributions of the latent variable, process noise, and
measurement noise, respectively. The square roots of the matrices refer to matrices
containing the square roots of each element of the original matrices.
4. Perform time updates. This involves calculating the current year’s sigma points for
the latent distribution and for the signal by inputting the previous year’s sigma points
to Equation (2.3) and the measurement function. We denote these quantities using
vectors χ(h)t|t−1 and yt|t−1, respectively. Weighting the updated sigma points then yields
the anticipated mean and variance (denoted by x̂−t and P−t ) of the latent variable, as





































where L = 3 is the dimension of vector x̂at−1, the scaling parameter is λUKF =
α2UKF (L+ κUKF )− L, the weights are
• W (m)0 =
λUKF
L+λUKF ,
• W (c)0 = W
(m)
0 + (1− α2UKF + βUKF ),
• W (m)i = W
(c)
i = 12(L+λUKF ) ,∀i ∈ {1, ..., 2L},
and χ(h)i,t|t−1 and yi,t|t−1 are the i
th element of vectors χ(h)t|t−1 and yt|t−1, respectively,
∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2L}. In our simulation study, we apply the following UKF parameter
values based on the suggestions from Wan and Van Der Merwe’s paper: αUKF =
10−0.5, βUKF = 2, and κUKF = 0.
5. Perform measurement updates, which means adjusting the estimates from Step 4 given
the current year’s observed signal. The updated mean and variance of the approximate















i (χi,t|t−1 − x̂
−





h̃t,j = x̂−t + κ(Lt,j − ŷ−t ),
ρ2t,j = P−t − κ2Pỹkỹk .
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Appendix B
Derivations for the Two-Options
Plan
In all the derivations in this appendix, we assume the following:
• that both the actuary and the plan member know the true annual mean loss parameter,
µj ,
• that plan member j’s annual loss, Lj , follows a gamma distribution with shape pa-




and cumulative distribution function FLj (l;αj , β),
• that all plan members’ utility functions are exponential, with an absolute risk aversion
parameter of R. That is,
uj(c) = u(c) = −e−Rc, ∀j,
• that β −R > 0, and
• that the reimbursement function is as defined in Equation (2.1).
We also omit the time index, t, in the first four derivations to alleviate the notation.
B.1 Expected Claims in the Special Case
Let EC(αj , k) be plan member j’s expected claims in option k, given that their true mean
loss parameter is µj (and therefore the shape parameter of their loss distribution is αj =
µjβ). Then
EC(αj , k) = E[r(Lj , k)|αj ]
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+ dk;αj + 1, β
)]
− (dk + CMk)
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= OMk[1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αj , β)],
and FL(l, α, β) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a gamma distribution with
shape parameter α and rate parameter β, evaluated at point l.
B.2 Expected Utility of Selecting Option k
Let EU(αj , k) be plan member j’s expected utility, given that their true mean loss parameter
is µj (and therefore the shape parameter of their loss distribution is αj = µjβ) and that
they select option k. Also, let yj,k = wj − (1− s)Dk + F , where
• wj is the annual salary of plan member j,
• s is the percent of premium subsidy paid by the plan sponsor,
• Dk is the deposit rate of option k, and
• F is the annual flex credit.
Then
EU(αj , k) = E[u(yj,k + r(Lj)− Lj)|αj ]
= E[−e−R(yj,k+r(Lj)−Lj)|αj ]
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e−(yj,k+OMk)R[1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αj , β +R)].
B.3 Inequality Constraint For Calculating the Deposit Rates
in the Special Case with K = 2 Options
As described in Section 2.4.2, we assume the actuary splits the group of members ex ante
so that those with a mean loss parameter µj (and analogously, αj) below a certain pre-
determined threshold are allocated into the low risk group, G1, and those with µj (and
analogously, αj) above this threshold are placed into the high risk group, G2. The thresh-
old, for example, might be the median of all the µj ’s, so that the plan members are evenly
placed into the two groups. Then the feasible set of deposit rates {D1, D2} are constrained
by the following inequalities:
EU(αj , 2) < EU(αj , 1),∀j ∈ G1, and
EU(αj , 1) < EU(αj , 2),∀j ∈ G2,
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where the expected utility is derived in Appendix B.2. Note that we can write EU(αj , k) =
−e−(wj−(1−s)Dk+F )R × h(αj , k), where
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e−OMkR[1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αj , β +R)].
Then the above inequalities can be written as
e(1−s)R(D2−D1)h(αj , 2) >h(αj , 1), ∀j ∈ G1, and
e(1−s)R(D1−D2)h(αj , 1) >h(αj , 2), ∀j ∈ G2.
The following are two useful properties of h(αj , k):
1. Given β −R > 0, β > 0, and R > 0, we have h(αj , k) > 0.
Proof. We show that each of the four terms in Equation (B.1) is positive.
(a) The coefficient in the first term is positive because β − R > 0 and β > 0. We
also know that the cumulative distribution function, FL(dk;αj , β −R), is in the
interval (0,1). This implies that first term is positive.
(b) The coefficient in the second term of Equation (B.1) contains the parameter ck,
which is in the interval (0,1). This implies that (ck−1)R ∈ (−R, 0), which means
(ck − 1)R+ β > 0.





+ dk;αj , (ck − 1)R+ β
)
> FL(dk;αj , (ck − 1)R+ β).
Since both the coefficient and the difference in cumulative distribution functions
on the second and third lines are positive, the second term is also positive.
(c) We know that OMk + dk + CMk > CMk1−ck + dk, which implies




+ dk;αj , β
)
.
Since both the coefficient and the difference in cumulative distribution functions
is positive, the third term is positive as well.
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(d) Finally, we know that the cumulative distribution function FL(OMk + dk +
CMk;αj , β +R) is contained in the interval (0,1), which implies that
1− FL(OMk + dk + CMk;αj , β +R)
is positive. The fourth and final term is therefore positive.
Since h(αj , k) is a sum of four positive terms, it is positive.
2. Also, we have h(αj , 1) > h(αj , 2).
Proof. Clearly, if the deposit rates of the two options are equal, then any plan member
j will choose the higher coverage option. In other words, if D1 = D2 = D, then we
have
EU(αj , 2) > EU(αj , 1)
⇐⇒ − e−(wj−(1−s)D+F )Rh(αj , 2) > −e−(wj−(1−s)D+F )Rh(αj , 1)
⇐⇒ h(αj , 2) < h(αj , 1).
Since h(αj , k) does not depend on the deposit rates, it follows that h(αj , 1) > h(αj , 2)
always holds.
Therefore, by the first property above, the constraint inequalities can be combined as follows:
LB < D2 −D1 < UB,
























> 0 by the second property
above and s ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, since the expected utilities are continuous random variables, we can rewrite the
strict inequalities into the following constraint:
LB ≤ D2 −D1 ≤ UB.
59
B.4 Calculating the Deposit Rates in the Special Case with
K = 2 Options
Let Sj(D, µj) and nk be as defined in Section 2.
Then the ideal deposit rates are the solution to the optimization problem below, subject to












































= 0 for k 6= k′.
Solving this optimization using Lagrange multipliers, we obtain the solution of
D =

DLB = [DLB1 , DLB2 ] if D∗2 −D∗1 < LB
D∗ = [D∗1, D∗2] if LB ≤ D∗2 −D∗1 ≤ UB.




j∈Gk EC(αj , k)
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j∈G1 EC(αj , 1) + n2
∑









j∈G1 EC(αj , 1) + n2
∑





DLB2 =LB +DLB1 .
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B.5 Expected Total Annual Change in ASO Account Balance
The expected annual change in total ASO account balance is










































Given the solution presented in Appendix B.4, we have three cases:
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j∈Gt,1 EC(αt,j , 1) + n1n2
∑
































































































Clearly, regardless of which of the three cases hold, if n1 = n2 then
E[Annual change in total ASO balance] = 0.
It also follows that if n1 = n2 then
E[Year-end total ASO balance] = 0, ∀ year t.
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Appendix C
Including a Random Component in
the Selection Function
Under our assumption that all plan members rationally select their upcoming year’s op-
tions, the expected utility theory described in Section 2.3 suffices as a complete model for
individual preference under financial uncertainty. In general, however, not all plan members
sufficiently understand their benefits coverage, or even spend the time to make a selection
during the annual enrollment window (Garnick et al., 1993). A plan member may either
• make an informed decision consistent with expected utility theory (as we have assumed
in our model),
• make an uninformed decision, or
• not respond.
Therefore, to relax the assumption of all plan members being diligent (which is a require-
ment for adverse selection to occur), we can include a plan design feature that automatically
enrolls a plan member into a default option in case the plan member does not make a se-
lection. This default can be set to either a predetermined option k∗ or the plan member’s
current option.
With this additional plan design feature defined, we can then add a probabilistic layer to
the expected utility model to extend our framework to more general settings. Let
• p(i)t,j be the probability that plan member j makes an informed decision and selects
Ut,j in year t, and
• p(n)t,j be the probability that plan member j does not make a selection, so that de-
pending on the plan set up, the selection defaults to either this plan member’s current
option or k∗.
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We further assume that if the plan member makes an uninformed decision, this plan mem-






Let St,j ∈ {1, ... , K} be plan member j’s enrolled option in year t. Then Si,j follows a
multinomial distribution with the number of trials parameter equal to 1 and the probability
parameters determined using p(i)t,j and p
(n)
t,j .
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